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NICE rapid guidelines: exploring political influence on guidelines 50 
 51 
Abstract 52 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has been presented as 53 
politically independent, asserting it is free from industry influence and conflicts of interest so 54 
that its decisions may be led by evidence and science. We consider the ways in which soft 55 
political factors operate in guideline development processes at NICE such that guidelines 56 
are not truly led by science. We suggest that while NICE procedures explicitly incorporate 57 
scientific principles and mechanisms, including independent committees and quality 58 
assurance, these fail to operate as scientific practices because, for example, decisions may 59 
only be challenged through the courts, which regard NICE as a scientific authority. We then 60 
examine what the NICE rapid guideline procedure for COVID-19 reveals about the practical 61 
reality of claims about the scientific integrity of NICE guidelines. Changes to guideline 62 
development processes during the COVID-19 emergency demonstrated how easy it is to 63 
undermine the scientific integrity of NICE’s decision-making. The cancellation of the 64 
guideline programme and publication of a rapid guideline process specifically to address the 65 
COVID-19 pandemic removed scientific checks and balances, including independent 66 
committees, stakeholder consultation and quality assurance, demonstrating that the 67 
relationship between NICE and the UK government is more complex than a scientific 68 
principles truism.  We suggest that NICE is not (and indeed cannot be) truly independent of 69 
government in practice, nor can it be truly led by science, in part because of its relationship 70 
to the state, which it is simultaneously constituted by and constitutive of. 71 
 72 
Background 73 
Plans for a new National Institute for Clinical Excellence, later rebranded the National 74 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) were first set out in the New Labour 75 
government’s 1998 white paper ‘A First Class Service’[1]. The stated purpose of the new 76 
organisation was to address the so-called postcode lottery, with “unacceptable variations in 77 
the quality of care available to different NHS patients in different parts of the country”. The 78 
emphasis in government narrative was on improving health at the population level by 79 
“drawing on best available clinical evidence…to maximise health gain for the population”. 80 
NICE would “advise on best practice in the use of existing treatment options, appraise new 81 
health interventions, and advise the NHS on how they can be implemented and how best 82 
these might fit alongside existing treatments”. These statements suggest that at the outset, 83 
NICE was intended to have the authority to deliberate on matters of science and evidence; 84 
and to advise, rather than be instructed by, other health care organisations. NICE would be 85 
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led by science, generate knowledge and be free from political interference or advocacy from 86 
drug companies[2]. The argument we pursue in this paper is that if this independence 87 
existed at the outset, this function seems to have diminished over time and, moreover, it has 88 
been significantly undermined during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis that follows 89 
considers how various soft political factors may operate and how they undermine scientific 90 
integrity. 91 
 92 
How does ‘political independence’ work? 93 
NICE was established in 1999 as a type of Arm’s Length Body (ALB), at one remove from 94 
government, sponsored by the Department of Health. Early political opposition to NICE 95 
focused on its potential to operate as a rationing device, thus the status of ALB would 96 
appear to remove government from unpopular decisions and enable rationing to take place 97 
under claims of scientific legitimacy rather than economic need or political drivers. Claims 98 
about NICE’s role in rationing were proven wrong over its first few years during which it 99 
approved the majority of treatments it assessed and in so doing increased NHS treatment 100 
costs[3]; yet concerns about NICE’s role in rationing remain part of the ongoing political 101 
rhetoric around the NHS.  102 
 103 
Whether to increase the deniability of rationing claims or for other political purposes, the 104 
political independence of NICE was made more explicit in the 2012 Health and Social Care 105 
Act which “specifically prohibits the Secretary of State from directing [NICE] about matters 106 
relating to the substance of NICE’s advice, guidance or recommendations.” In 2013 NICE 107 
was thus re-established as a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) meaning that any 108 
changes to NICE’s powers or governance could now only be approved by parliament rather 109 
than by ministers alone, seemingly increasing its independence from government. A NDPB 110 
is defined as “a body which has a role in the processes of national government, but is not a 111 
government department, or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a greater or 112 
lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers”, meaning that “the day-today decisions they 113 
make are independent as they are removed from ministers and Civil Servants.”[4] This 114 
revision to the relationship can be regarded as a move towards a more explicit form of meta-115 
governance, whereby government mechanisms are enacted through a range of quasi-116 
autonomous bureaucratic devices. This can be seen, for example, in the way that NHS 117 
England operates through intermittent mandates issued by the Department of Health and 118 
Social Care (DHSC) setting out priorities for the coming year or years[5]. There has been a 119 
process of obfuscation across these mandates, from a set of clearly stated objectives in 120 
2013 towards a much less specific set of expectations in later mandates[6]. A lack of 121 
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specificity in the governing agreements of ALBs renders the possibility of remote governance 122 
through distal networks more possible, working to make the DHSC less accountable. 123 
 124 
In the context of NHS England, meta-governance refers to the idea that creating 125 
organisations “at arms’ length” from government is a way of obfuscating ministerial 126 
responsibility for difficult or unpopular political decisions.  Translating this to NICE, decisions 127 
about access to healthcare, for example, can be made remotely from ministers and political 128 
motive obscured by claims of the need for availability to be determined by science not 129 
politics. As such, similar to analyses of the role of NHS England, we propose that the 130 
accountability mechanisms in place for NICE also function based on a form of meta-131 
governance characterised by distal responsibility. Similar to the NHS England ‘mandate’, a 132 
Framework Agreement[7] sets out the legal relations between NICE and DHSC. This 133 
functions as a mechanism through which Government is able to hold NICE to account. The 134 
Secretary of State and the DHSC are “responsible to parliament for the system overall” and 135 
a Senior Departmental Sponsor liaises between NICE and the Secretary of State. This 136 
creates a number of layers in the chain of accountability, none of which relate to 137 
accountability for actual treatment approval decisions which must be made independently of 138 
the DHSC, and by extension, parliament. 139 
 140 
In practice, accountability for the overall functioning of NICE is to parliament. This is split off 141 
from accountability for decisions made about approving or refusing treatments. This would 142 
suggest that the primary determinant of treatment approvals or refusals is a non-specific and 143 
undefined body of current best international scientific evidence, raising questions about who 144 
decides what is ‘current’ and ‘best’. This ostensibly makes NICE responsible for all 145 
decisions, and conversely, means government is not held responsible when certain 146 
treatments are not made available in the NHS.  Appearing to ration healthcare is a difficult 147 
position for any parliamentary politician to openly embrace, but at the same time, it is a 148 
necessary, indeed vital, component of the social and political organisation of population 149 
healthcare. In order to counter allegations of undue political influence, it is important for 150 
sitting Governments that the political independence and scientific integrity of NICE is 151 
explicitly assured and demonstrated, so that decisions appear to be evidence-based rather 152 
than politically driven.  153 
 154 
The recent response to COVID-19 suggests that rather than NDPBs all operating at an 155 
equivalent level in terms of relationship to Government, a hierarchy between NDPBs may 156 
have evolved over time, further obfuscating the political factors driving decisions concerning 157 
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availability of treatments in the NHS. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a level 4 national 158 
emergency was declared. At the start of the UK lockdown, NHS England and NHS 159 
Improvement requested that NICE postpone their approved guideline programme and 160 
instead prioritise a programme of rapid guidelines to support the NHS response to the 161 
emergency[8]. In this context, it would seem that NICE was subject to a hierarchy of decision 162 
making via NHS England, the latter acting as the distal network implementing government 163 
agenda through other NDPBs. We explore the implications of the COVID-19 rapid guidelines 164 
later on; first, we consider the extent to which scientific principles operated in NICE guideline 165 
development prior to the pandemic. 166 
 167 
Independent decisions led by science? 168 
Limited attention has been paid to the role of various less visible influences on scientific 169 
decision-making processes within NICE. In emphasising ‘political independence’, the 170 
implication is that as long as NICE can demonstrate independence from government 171 
ministers, then it is being led by science – that NICE adheres to principles of empirical 172 
science, and that this obviates the need to be accountable in any other way for its decisions. 173 
Implicit here is that all science is objective and empirical and beyond any undue or improper 174 
influence by vested interests. NICE documentation acknowledges that there are 175 
uncertainties in science and since 2005 has attempted to weave ‘Social Value Judgements’ 176 
into its ways of working, including moral principles, distributive and procedural justice[9]. 177 
Nevertheless, NICE has committed to making decisions led primarily by science; and that 178 
while value judgements have a role, these are openly acknowledged and free from political 179 
motivation. 180 
 181 
In order to consider decisions of any sort to have been led by science, we should have a 182 
view on what constitutes scientific practice. We propose that the concept of a state 183 
appointed scientific authority (albeit one purportedly operating at arm’s-length from 184 
government with a range of checks and balances) is potentially incongruent with the 185 
scientific method which values questioning and challenge above adherence to the views of 186 
the most powerful agents. For most of the scientific community, questioning and challenge 187 
comes in the form of peer review, serial rejections, rebuttals and so forth. NICE guidelines 188 
are not subject to these pre-publishing hurdles and so, in their place, there is a manual, 189 
setting out the process for developing guidelines including quality assurance procedures[10].  190 
 191 
Certain scientific checks and balances exist within NICE procedures in respect of health 192 
technology appraisals (HTAs) for which there is an independent evidence review process. It 193 
Accepted version 
6 
Published version: McPherson S, Speed E NICE rapid guidelines: exploring political influence on guidelines. BMJ 
Evidence-Based Medicine Published Online First: 13 April 2021. doi: 10.1136/bmjebm-2020-111635  
 
has been argued that the rigour of these processes has been diluted by new procedures 194 
such as fast track appraisal[11]. Moreover, while there is a formal appeals process, appeals 195 
have most often been brought by manufacturers, less than half of these have succeeded 196 
and of those that did, only a third related to ‘unreasonable evidence’[12]. Our current 197 
analysis focuses on guidelines rather than HTAs, the latter having historically been more 198 
rigorous because they lead directly to policy whereas guidelines are advisory only. Focusing 199 
on guideline development, we argue that there are a range of means by which political 200 
factors influence decision making.  201 
 202 
Within NICE guideline development, a key aspect of scientific integrity is the role of guideline 203 
committees made up of independent experts, appointed through an open application 204 
process. Whilst committees enhance scientific integrity, they also provide an additional layer 205 
of distal responsibility, separating DHSC yet further from decisions about treatment 206 
availability. Further, NICE maintains soft forms of control over committee functions by 207 
employing technical advisors and systematic reviewers who collate evidence and advise 208 
committees on the interpretation of evidence. Committees are also required to follow the 209 
NICE guideline manual, which sets out a relatively singular position on evidence synthesis 210 
and hierarchies of evidence.  211 
 212 
NICE guidelines are also subject to judicial review, seemingly improving scientific integrity. 213 
Yet, in spite of considerable scientific criticism over a range of different guidelines as well as 214 
numerous challenges on scientific grounds from drug industry and patient lobbies, published 215 
NICE guidelines have only been subject to a handful of judicial reviews[13], most of which 216 
were overturned. One was eventually won in the Court of Appeal but the grounds for most 217 
court decisions in favour of NICE’s scientific judgements have rested on the position that 218 
judges cannot override scientific judgements made by a scientific authority in favour of a 219 
claimant who has a different view of the science (see Box 1). 220 
 221 
Box 1: High Court Decisions 
 
“Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a 
public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the 
debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact 
to the body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision making power save in a case 
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Fraser & Anor, R (on the application of) v National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence & Ors [2009] EWHC 452 (Admin). 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/452.html 
 222 
In this sense, the reliance on science creates a paradox whereby claims to scientific 223 
knowledge trump all other claims to other forms of knowledge. This implies that whilst a 224 
court may in theory overturn a decision by NICE which was clearly influenced by government 225 
ministers, it would not in practice overturn a decision on grounds of scientific contestation. In 226 
practice, NICE has been delegated by parliament to evaluate evidence and make decisions; 227 
yet its decisions seem unquestionable by virtue of NICE having been “entrusted” by 228 
parliament.  229 
 230 
The NICE guideline manual makes explicit the way in which the quality assurance process 231 
incorporates and operationalises scientific principles such as managing bias and conflicts of 232 
interest, approaches to critical appraisal of research, peer review and quality assurance. In 233 
terms of accountability, stakeholder consultation on guidelines is set out as a core feature of 234 
quality assurance, almost as an alternative form of peer review. Yet the process of 235 
stakeholder consultation is comparatively light touch.  For example, relevant stakeholders 236 
might be companies that manufacture medicines for profit who may comment on all 237 
consultation documents; indeed in some cases industry representatives may even be 238 
committee members[10]. The scheduled period for stakeholder consultation and timelines for 239 
revision and final publication of each guideline are very short for a document as complex as 240 
a guideline and mean that guideline committees could not reasonably take any serious 241 
methodological challenges into account. Unlike peer review, there is no imperative for the 242 
committee to address all stakeholder comments and the committee may, according to the 243 
manual, choose not to publish or respond to longer comments[10]. This makes it difficult for 244 
stakeholders to have anything other than minor impact on relatively superficial issues rather 245 
than having any serious impact on fundamental epistemological issues. In effect, 246 
stakeholder consultations provide a proofreading function rather than scientific scrutiny. 247 
There is no requirement for revised guidelines to be checked a second time by stakeholders. 248 
Examples have been offered of how this process has led to serious methodological issues 249 
being brushed aside by NICE responses to consultations[13]. 250 
 251 
COVID-19 rapid guidelines 252 
As noted earlier, NICE was asked to reprioritise all guideline programmes which had been 253 
set out in its annual programme at the point that the UK declared a public health emergency 254 
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in 2020.  In turn, NICE released documentation describing a new programme of ‘rapid 255 
guidelines’[14] in which both independent committees and the process of systematic review 256 
were removed, substantially weakening claims about scientific integrity and independent 257 
decision making. Rapid guidelines would repurpose existing reviews sourced from previous 258 
NICE guidelines, the World Health Organisation, Public Health England, the Medicines and 259 
Healthcare Regulatory Authority or professional bodies. These contributing organisations are 260 
a mixture of government, international advisory bodies, industry or professionally led bodies 261 
and therefore not politically nor scientifically ‘independent’ in the sense NICE is purported to 262 
be. Furthermore, there were no independently appointed guideline committees and the 263 
manual for creating rapid guidelines omitted all elements of stakeholder consultation and risk 264 
of bias assessment. This means that any previous concerns regarding accountability, 265 
supposedly assuaged by committee independence and stakeholder consultation were not 266 
addressed in these new processes. The quality control process for approving rapid 267 
guidelines involved “a pragmatic accuracy check” and the guidelines would be reviewed by 268 
NHS England prior to publication. This was a new role for NHS England in the guideline 269 
authorisation process, confirming the emergence of a governance hierarchy among NDPBs. 270 
Whilst appearing to present a necessarily expedient approach to an emergency, the 271 
elements omitted were all vital tenets of ensuring appropriate scientific method and quality 272 
assurance.  273 
 274 
The rapid guideline approach was updated in July 2020 in the form of a more detailed 275 
interim process for emergency situations[15]. This replaced, in diluted forms, some elements 276 
of scientific integrity such as an independent advisory expert panel but without open 277 
recruitment. Stakeholder consultation was reintroduced but limited to half a day or up to a 278 
week. The sources of evidence that might be consulted were expanded but retained the 279 
potential to repurpose WHO or MHRA guidelines or advice. NHS England would no longer 280 
be part of quality control but both NHS England and the DHSC retained a role in determining 281 
topic selection for emergency guideline development.  282 
 283 
Whether or not there may have been ways to better manage the balance of expediency 284 
versus quality between March and July 2020, the fact that expediency at the request of 285 
another NDPB was able to take precedence over scientific scrutiny, raises important 286 
questions about the legal and political framework under which these sudden changes were 287 
implemented and what they might reveal about how the role and function of NICE has 288 
evolved. It is also open to question whether the more permanent emergency process put 289 
forward in July 2020 is an adequate way to balance these concerns. Given NICE was 290 
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established primarily as a science-led organisation to end unwarranted variation in treatment 291 
whilst avoiding industry influence, the explicit removal of some or all scientific checks and 292 
balances in an emergency situation suggests that the central reliance of NICE on claims to 293 
scientific legitimacy is not in fact central at all. Rather it is the first feature to be removed in 294 
the interests of expediency as though scientific processes were unnecessary bureaucracy.  295 
 296 
This begs the question that if NICE is no longer able to make claims to scientific integrity, 297 
then on what basis is it accountable for its decisions? Political drivers could now, without any 298 
new legal agreement, prior discussion in parliament or amendment to the Framework 299 
Agreement, directly influence the scope and content of rapid guidelines, for example by 300 
enabling the direct repurposing of guidance or policy written by them. NHS England could 301 
also have ultimate oversight, bypassing DHSC and therefore the Framework Agreement. 302 
This inverts the original assertion that NICE would be a politically independent body led by 303 
science which would advise other health bodies rather than take advice or direction from any 304 
other organisation. The rapidity with which this commitment was dropped by NICE, in 305 
addition to suggesting that scientific and political independence were only superficially 306 
written into the institutional fabric of NICE (such as the Framework Agreement, Charter and 307 
principles), also highlights questions around the implications and consequences of the UK 308 
government’s overall commitment to their COVID-19 response being “driven by science”.  309 
Science is, by its very nature, never particularly rapid and therefore no political response to a 310 
novel situation can be led by science; it can only be led by politicians informed by incomplete 311 
speculative hypotheses from multiple sources with an inevitably wide range of built-in biases 312 
and conflicts of interest. In essence, NICE cannot be truly led by science, in part because of 313 
its relationship to the state, however obscure that relationship has been made. 314 
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